"Independent Observer" bloc's preliminary message about the parliamentary elections in Georgia:

The "Independent Observer" alliance, represented by the "Helsinki Civil Assembly Vanadzor Office" and the "Union of Informed Citizens," carried out an observation mission with 18 observers in the Georgian parliamentary elections held on October 26.

Before the elections, the observers met with the representatives of other missions accredited in Georgia and the leadership of the Central Election Administration of Georgia. They observed the opposition rallies held on October 20 and the "Georgian Dream" rallies held on October 23.
For the first time in the elections, digital devices for voter registration and ballot scanning were used, and the Central Electoral Administration conducted extensive public awareness campaigns in Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani.

During the pre-election phase and on the day of voting, the mission received many credible reports of voter bribery and administrative leverage on voter turnout, sometimes combined with the collection of voter identification (ID) cards.

The mission noticed a number of steps by representatives of the "Georgian Dream" party and election commissions that were aimed at reducing voters' confidence in the secrecy of voting. These included the shape and location of polling booths, the ruling party's installation of cameras at polling stations, and the spreading of misinformation legends about other forms of vote control.

On the day of the voting, the observers, who were composed of 8 itinerant groups, followed the process and summary of the voting in 54 precincts of Tbilisi and regions (mainly in the Samtskhe-Javakhet region). Violations of voting secrecy were observed in about 50 percent of the monitored polling stations, which were usually manifested by another person monitoring (monitoring) the voter's vote.

Against the background of alerts about voting instead of another person with the collected identification cards, it was more worrying that in the polling centers observed, the observers widely followed that even the inking of voters' fingers in their presence (or checking the absence of ink on the fingers of incoming voters) is not done correctly (it should be noted that UV Inking voters' fingers with colorless ink visible under light are one of the primary mechanisms to prevent double voting in Georgia.

At the same time, given the widespread availability of voters' passport data among ruling party representatives, it was even more worrying that the summary information of the electronic registration devices did not record which voters' passport data were entered manually rather than read by the device. Manual data entry can occur without the presence of the voter and even without the presence of an identity document. It can be used, for example, to vote for a person absent from the country.

In more than 22 percent of the precincts observed by the mission, crowds of people were observed at the entrance, which, as a rule, did not consist of voters, but supporters of political forces. In these gatherings, people could be seen carrying out campaigning, escorting voters to the polling station, and identifying voters who had yet to arrive at the polling station. Without exception, these individuals were authorized representatives of the Georgian Dream party or local observers reporting their affiliation with the ruling party.
Observers observed electoral commissions in most polling centers lacking knowledge of legislation and procedures. That problem was more noticeable in rural areas.

About 20,000 local observers were accredited in the elections. Still, at the polling station, it was often observed that persons with observer certificates presented as representatives of the "Georgian Dream" and did not show neutral behavior.

In several polling stations, observers saw voters approach a Georgian Dream representative in the area who was making notes on his list before coming to the polling booth.

The observers' activity was hindered during the observation in 3 regional centers. In the 22/4 precinct, our observer was physically assaulted when he tried to film the situation in the precinct center. The mission was forced to cease monitoring at the site.

Considering the observations mentioned above and the protocols of other reliable observation missions, the "Independent Observer" alliance is forced to record that the parliamentary elections of October 26, 2024, in Georgia were marked by significant violations, which overshadow the credibility of the election results.

"Independent Observer" bloc