Radar Armenia's interlocutor is Shahan Gantaharyan, an international scholar.

- The PACE adopted the resolution "Ensuring free and safe access through the Lachin Corridor" by vote, which clearly states that there is no free and safe movement through the Lachin Corridor. What will this change in the current situation if we consider that Azerbaijan still needs to fulfill the decision of the UN International Court of Justice?

- The whole point of the PACE resolution can be summed up in the following two key points.

a. The Assembly calls for urgent addressing of the rights and security issues of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh through a dialogue between Baku and Stepanakert and to ensure neutral international involvement for using any mechanism aimed at peace.

b. The Assembly calls on Azerbaijan to invite the delegation of the Council of Europe to visit the Lachin Corridor and Nagorno-Karabakh on a fact-finding mission and assess the situation on the spot. The Assembly also calls for Azerbaijan to allow other international organizations, including UN institutions, to enter the region.

These two directions are the priority of the EU's policy on the Artsakh issue. In both points, neutral international involvement, the sending of a fact-finding mission of the Council of Europe, and the deployment of international organizations, including UN institutions, in the region are proposed.
All these are nothing but counterbalancing or pushing out the Russian factor.

- The American side announced that they are looking forward to the next round of negotiations in Washington. What are your expectations, considering the fundamental differences between the positions of Armenia and Azerbaijan?

- Yes, you mentioned it correctly. Washington used the qualification "impatience," which speaks of lively involvement. There is coordination between the initiatives and tasks of Washington and Brussels. I don't think PACE's strictness and directness will resonate in Washington. However, the need for international guarantees will be emphasized. And if Baku partially lifts the blockade after Washington, it will make it clear that Baku is giving the USA a card.

- Deputy Prime Minister of Armenia Mher Grigoryan stated that Azerbaijan responded positively to the proposal of the Armenian side about the meeting of commissions on Armenian-Azerbaijani border demarcation issues. How will you interpret it?

- It needs to be clarified what map the process is based on. There was a reference to the 1975 maps, which still required to be published. Baku is in a hurry to implement border demarcation, so it is reacting positively.

- According to the RA Deputy Prime Minister, there is a critical consensus that the unblocking process begins with the re-operation of the Yeraskh-Horadiz railway. He also noted that there is a final perception that regulations should be under the jurisdiction and sovereignty of countries. How realistic is this?

- The opening of roads and channels is the 9th point of the November agreement. But there is a problem here. Baku is talking about the corridor. There is no corridor at point 9, but there is security control by Russian troops. And Yerevan declares that there is still no agreement with Moscow in this direction. For the Armenian side, this is the only and last conceding point with the wording of lifting the blockade. From the prisoners of war to the embargo of Artsakh and the installation of a checkpoint in Lachin, these are clear cases of violation of the November agreement.

- The head of the EU delegation and observers patrolled near the Hakar bridge. In diplomatic and political terms, what should be understood under this step?

- All these are operations carried out in the Armenian sector. Azerbaijan does not allow such missions on its territory. Brussels penetrates the region with these missions.

- Bayramov stated that they do not accept the precondition of providing unique security guarantees to Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, that Armenians can live and be educated in their language only in case of integration. In case of such rhetoric, what will the Baku-Stepanakert negotiations change?

- The objectification of the Baku-Stepanakert negotiation format is conditioned by the second component of that task: international guarantees of rights and security. Going to negotiations without this component means accepting the game rules specified by Baku.

Hayk Magoyan