Radar Armenia's interlocutor is Areg Kochinyan, the Security Policy Research Center president.

- Although RA Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reaffirmed yesterday once again that there cannot be an extraterritorial corridor through Armenia, Aliyev continues to insist that there is such a provision in the statement of November 9, 2020, and, at the same time, states that Baku has no plans to start a new war with Armenia. In your opinion, does Aliyev's rhetoric contain a risk of further military escalation?

- Aliyev's statement naturally carries the risk of a new escalation. There is already an escalation. It keeps the Lachin corridor closed, a means of blackmail to get a passage from Armenia. Aliyev is implementing his statement that Armenia will get the same status in Lachin that it will secure in Meghri, with some checkpoint logic. And the danger of military escalation itself, yes, I repeat, I see it. Moreover, I see it in the short term because if this tool used by Azerbaijan does not give any results to see any concessions both in Artsakh and in Armenia, I do not rule out that they will go to more significant escalations.

- Official Yerevan has refused to hold CSTO military exercises in Armenia. In your opinion, what significance and consequence can this have? Will CSTO revise its policy after this step?

- Official Yerevan's refusal to hold CSTO military exercises in Armenia can be explained in two ways. We need a formulated strategic goal, for example, leaving the CSTO; this is an outstanding, important milestone. And it is a crucial step to work in that direction. If this is just a decision of the day and an action without a strategic goal, then it is a wrong policy. And what consequences can it have? The policy of the CSTO and its member states will not change much as a result of this step.

- Is it possible that Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, will apply to the UN Security Council to grant the Russian peacekeeping force an international mandate?

- I rule out Russia applying to the UN Security Council to give its peacekeeping contingent an international mandate. First, Russia is not a new member of the United Nations; Russia was also a permanent member of the UN Security Council in November 2020. It could apply even if it felt the need to endow its peacekeepers with such a mandate. It did not feel such a need then; it did not feel it during the past two years and will likely not feel it in the future if everything goes according to the political plan.

- Is it likely that international peacekeeping forces will be deployed to resolve the Lachin Corridor?

- At the moment, it is doubtful that it will be possible to attract an international peacekeeping contingent to unblock the Lachin Corridor.

Hayk Magoyan