The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) held its regular summit in Bishkek on November 27, bringing together the leaders of all the organization's member states, except Armenia. Yerevan was absent, describing its continued boycott as a "freezing of membership." In reality, however, this is not a freezing of Armenia's membership, but only of its physical participation in CSTO events. As CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov noted, Armenia continues to accept all documents in absentia, with the drafts sent to Yerevan in advance.
Thus, Yerevan's semi-boycott seems to have become an internal "comfort zone" that mitigates the deep-rooted value incompatibility between Armenia and the CSTO.
A Declaration with Silenced Cries
The Bishkek summit ended with the adoption of a Declaration of the Collective Security Council. At first glance, it contains nothing extraordinary. However, there are noteworthy layers in the footnotes of its template formulations that are much more telling.
For example, the document refers to the Armenia-Azerbaijan dialogue. In particular, it is noted that the structure accepts "active dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan and stands in favor of a comprehensive settlement and the early signing of a peace treaty." The reference has silently bypassed the peace platform within the framework of which the Armenian-Azerbaijani communication and developments around the peace treaty are taking place.
This is noteworthy because Moscow never misses an opportunity to use such documents to emphasize its exclusive role, for example, through its trilateral statements and agreements with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, there is no such reference this time. Neither Russia nor the other member states, in fact, have been able to bypass the circumstance of the American "umbrella" opening in the region.
In addition, the document condemns the "use of unilateral coercive measures as a means of political, economic and financial pressure," which it says contradicts the UN Charter. Although it is obvious that the international sanctions applied to Russia are being taken into account (there is no other member state for which this issue is so relevant), the declaration itself does not specify either the beneficiary or the manifestations of these pressure measures. Without targeting, the reflection of this idea speaks to one thing: Russia sought to form an alliance tandem against the sanctions imposed on it, but it failed in its behind-the-scenes communication with CSTO member states. And Moscow was forced to compromise on the formulations in place to avoid damaging the impression of the CSTO's fictitious unity.
Does the Ukrainian War Not Exist for the CSTO?
What is even more striking is that, although the declaration carefully addressed the Israel-Gaza conflict, the border tensions between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the Pakistan-India and Armenia-Azerbaijan conflicts, it just as carefully bypassed the world's number one conflict, which directly affects the interests of the largest CSTO member state, Russia. We are talking about the Russian-Ukrainian war, which the declaration does not directly address. And this is especially noteworthy, as the CSTO summit is taking place at perhaps the most sensitive stage of the conflict, against the backdrop of discussions of the American plan, when Moscow itself, at the highest level, considered that plan acceptable as a basis for settlement negotiations.
The CSTO's deliberate silence on this agenda could mean two things. First, Moscow itself avoided addressing this issue in the main document of the CSTO summit, so as not to constrain itself in future maneuvers by adopting any position. On November 26, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated without any nuance that Ukraine will be forced to hand over the Donetsk region to them. And if it does not do this of its own accord, they will resolve this issue by force. In other words, the Kremlin, against the backdrop of intensive Ukrainian-American negotiations and moves to remove or modify specific points of the plan during them, is clearly showing that it has absolutely no desire to compromise; that is, it is raising the price of further negotiations with it. Under these conditions, it is unlikely that the CSTO would become a platform for expressing any guiding position.
Secondly, the CSTO member states, especially the Central Asian ones, did not want to address the Ukrainian crisis in any way, being against the Russian aggressive scenario. The Ukrainian issue is absent from the document, even though in Bishkek, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko was particularly diligent in his speech, spreading the message that the member states highly appreciate Putin personally and the Russian-American diplomatic efforts to achieve a final peace. If others really think so, why isn't this idea included in the organization's declaration? The other member states have a significant reason not to allow this.
In his speech during the Bishkek summit, the Belarusian president also stated that the borders of the CSTO are under threat, since NATO’s military budget is an indicator of a “war regime,” and Eastern European countries, including Poland, the Baltic states, and Germany, have multiplied their military budgets and resources. From this, Lukashenko concludes that the West is preparing for war against them.
These steps by Lukashenko to appear more Catholic than the Pope were not just a simple display of affectionate reverence for Putin. They noted that the Russia-Belarus pair considered the CSTO an object of involvement in a global confrontation against the West, which, however, does not align with the political doctrinal priorities of either Armenia or the Central Asian CSTO member states. The absence of the Ukrainian theme in the CSTO Bishkek Declaration may be a clear message to Moscow not to become part of that adventure.
The smokescreen of incapacity
In other words, the Bishkek summit became another indicator not of the CSTO’s mobility and military-political solidarity, but of its inefficiency. The vague wording of the declaration, the silence around Ukraine, the “sparing” packaging of Russia’s interests, and Lukashenko’s bellicose comments show that the foreign policy vectors within the CSTO are diverging, and the motivations of the member states are diametrically different. And the fact that the structure is unable to reconcile its own internal and external interests, the value field, testifies to the inability of that structure to ensure adequate collective security, which is simply scattered with various declarations.
Gor Abrahamyan
