On August 29, 2025, the Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Armenia, Armen Grigoryan, left for Tehran at the invitation of the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ali Larijani. It is noteworthy that the visit takes place literally days after the first official visit of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to Yerevan. This indicates that even after that, there are still open and clarifying issues on the agenda of contacts with Yerevan for Tehran, and Pezeshkian's visit did not provide all the answers that would dispel Iran's concerns, especially in the context of regional developments.
In the Shadow of the Washington Agreement and the TRIPP Project
Pezeshkian's visit to Yerevan took place on August 8, against the backdrop of the initialing of the peace agreement between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Washington with the direct participation of US President Donald Trump. The signing of the Trilateral Statement, and in particular, the documents on the launch of the regionally significant TRIPP transport and communication project, created a new reality in the South Caucasus, especially in terms of the reintegration of the Iranian factor.
The high-level Armenian-Iranian negotiations held in Yerevan were distinguished by a constructive atmosphere. The agreements reached concerned specific economic and infrastructure projects. Of particular importance were the agreements on accelerating the construction of the second bridge over the Araks River and the opportunities for attracting Iranian companies and capital to the "North-South" road and transport hub project in Syunik. This suggests that Iran continues to support Armenia's efforts in developing trade, economic, and communication channels with the outside world, which provides a broad front for cooperation.
However, all this does not overshadow the fact that Iran sees challenges to its own security in the regional field after the signing of the Washington documents.
The issue of control over transport routes
Tehran is sending a clear signal that it is not opposed to the creation of unhindered communication between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan via Meghri, provided that Armenia maintains complete control over the routes passing through its territory. However, Iran is concerned that this control may be delegated to extra-regional entities, especially American structures, regardless of whether they contain a military element or not. In Tehran's perception, this is also a means of controlling the northwest and constitutes a security threat to the region. Here, Iran's problem has shifted from the domains of Azerbaijan and Turkey to Armenia, and Yerevan is the only entity that can provide guarantees of neutralizing this threat or, at the very least, controlling it. For this purpose, Tehran aims to delve into the details of the mechanisms controlling the Azerbaijan-Nakhichevan communication, as that is where the "dog's head" is buried.
Neutralization of the "3+3" format
Iran views the Washington process not only as a manifestation of "bringing in a new player from outside," but also as a manifestation of replacing itself with that player. For Tehran, the "3+3" format is the primary lever of influence in the South Caucasus, and Tehran understands that through the Washington process, Yerevan and Baku have effectively undermined the political value and significance of that format. The United States, at least for now, is a regional player, and this has been ensured by at least two actors in the "3+3" format. It is no coincidence that during the Pezeshkian-Putin phone call on August 26, the Iranian president also specifically emphasized the need to preserve that format. Iran hopes that with the active participation of Russia and Turkey, it will be able to return to that format in Yerevan and Baku. However, today it is clear to all players that this format is already mostly a sham, since in practice the West has an undisguised regional involvement, and this is the only option for Armenia to break the tight circle.
Competition over the "North-South" corridor
A few days ago, in a telephone conversation with Vladimir Putin, Pezeshkian also emphasized the importance of completing the Rasht-Astara railway as soon as possible. This railway is a crucial component of the railway hub connecting Iran to Russia via Azerbaijan. This is not a random mention. Iran indirectly warns that if there is such an American presence in the Syunik communication projects, it will consider it a threat to its vital interests. Armenia may lose the opportunity to become a counterweight to the Azerbaijani direction in the "North-South" axis. This can be considered a warning to make the Armenian "Crossroads of Peace" project inoperable.
Iran's Constructivity Should Have No Alternative
The problem is that no economic or security project for Armenia in the South Caucasus can be viable without Iran's constructive participation. Armenia can represent a communication interest for global financial centers, especially and first of all, with the operability of its infrastructures working with Iran. In this regard, Tehran's loyalty is vital for Armenia; its loss would be severe and strike a blow to Armenia's subjectivity. It is for this reason that Yerevan is compelled to undertake more intensive behind-the-scenes work with other interested parties, including Iran, to develop models of control over communications passing through Syunik that will not harm relations with Tehran, but will also address Armenia's security and de-blockade challenges.
From this perspective, sometimes, in Yerevan expert circles, the view is voiced that if Iran has come to terms with the fact of the presence of Israeli special services in southern Azerbaijan, and this does not interfere with the building of its relations with Baku, then it can also come to terms with sharp developments undesirable for it on the Armenian front. This is a very bold, even reckless approach. First, Armenia does not have a multi-million ethnic presence in Iran, like Azerbaijan, which it can use at any time as a tool for Iran's internal destabilization, which Tehran has always warned against. Secondly, Armenia does not have such a stable and unconditional ally as Turkey is for Azerbaijan, and this is a powerful signal for Tehran that any military escalation with Azerbaijan will automatically lead to a military confrontation with NATO member Turkey, with the ensuing consequences. Thirdly, the southern land route is not as vital for Azerbaijan as it is for besieged Armenia, and the threat of closing the Iranian border does not promise such disastrous consequences for Azerbaijan as for Armenia. It is necessary to be much more pragmatic and cautious. Iran can and should have constructive involvement in projects related to the South Caucasus, and this is as much a problem for Tehran as it is for Yerevan. This suggests that Yerevan should strive to become a platform for dialogue between the United States and Iran, despite the current unlikelihood of this scenario.
Gor Abrahamyan
