In an article published on the Responsible Statecraft website, Jeong Eun-Lee, an associate professor of political science at North Greenville University, addressed the Russo-Ukrainian war and US mediation efforts.

The article analyzes the challenges of a peaceful resolution of the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, focusing on territorial disputes. Applying Prospect Theory, the author explains why Ukraine and Russia reject peace proposals that imply territorial concessions and proposes an alternative approach to the settlement based on temporary uncertainty of the territorial status. The article emphasizes that the psychological perceptions, domestic political pressures, and geopolitical goals of the leaders of Russia and Ukraine hinder a rapid resolution of the conflict. It also discusses the role of the Trump administration as a mediator and proposes a strategy that would allow temporarily "freezing" territorial disputes, postponing their final settlement.

"Diplomatic efforts have been ongoing since the beginning of Donald Trump's second presidential term to resolve the three-year war between Russia and Ukraine peacefully. However, negotiations have not yet overcome the profound differences between the two sides.

The main contentious issues are the security situation for Ukraine after the war guarantees and the political status of Ukrainian territories claimed or annexed by Russia. In particular, regarding territorial sovereignty, Ukraine and Russia have rejected a US proposal to "freeze" the war along the current conflict line as a de facto new border. Ukraine has refused to compromise on its claims to sovereignty over the territories occupied by Russia (including Crimea, which was annexed in 2014). In turn, Russia has demanded that Ukraine recognize Russia's territorial claims to four Ukrainian regions annexed in 2022.

To proponents of a peaceful settlement, the behavior of Ukraine and Russia may seem irrational, prolonging the war in pursuit of costly and even unrealistic goals. Ukraine, especially with the potential for reduced US support, is unlikely to be able to push Russian troops back from its sovereign territory successfully. Russia, for its part, has made only gradual and costly progress in recent military offensives. Despite some positions Despite the loss, Ukrainian forces still control significant areas of the four regions annexed by Russia.

As Harvard University professor Graham Ellison noted early in the war, if future military operations are likely only marginally to alter the final territorial boundaries, it may be in the parties' best interests to settle the war now. So why aren't they doing so?

Prospect Theory can help us better understand the psychology of Russian and Ukrainian leaders. This theory, which draws from behavioral economics and psychology, explains why politicians may be inclined (or not) to make specific policy decisions. The theory suggests that people, including politicians, assess their situation based on a psychological baseline that determines whether they are in the "winners" or "losers" zone. If people perceive their situation below the baseline, they are less likely to accept the current status quo. Instead, they are more likely to engage in risky behavior to improve their situation.

Negotiations for a settlement of the war face difficulties when the parties perceive themselves to be on a "losing ground." Leaders reject settlement terms that would enshrine their current losses, including territorial losses. For Ukraine, the territorial basis is the restoration of the sovereign borders that existed before Russia annexed Crimea. While Ukraine has supported a temporary peace, it has opposed a formal settlement requiring international recognition of the new border between Ukraine and Russia. Ukrainian leaders reject the permanent loss of their sovereign territory and face domestic political pressure, as some polls show that a majority of the Ukrainian public opposes territorial concessions as a condition for peace.

While Russia may appear to have made significant territorial gains (occupying nearly 20% of Ukraine's territory), the Russian government has been at odds with the West (even without formal NATO membership) and perceives its inability to prevent geopolitical developments as a "geopolitical loss." Continuing to demand Ukraine's "neutrality" and "disarmament," Russia seems determined to obtain international (and Ukrainian) recognition of its annexation of Crimea and four southeastern Ukrainian regions as compensation for Russia's losses. The territorial expansion would also serve as a public demonstration of the victory of the "special military operation" that was launched under the pretext of defending the self-determination of Ukraine's Russian-speaking population and regions.

For the Trump administration, which is eager for a quick end to the war, the challenge is to persuade Ukraine and Russia to accept a territorial border that is lower than their respective bases. Ukraine will not return to the territories occupied by Russia, while Russia will not gain complete control of its annexed territories. The strategy usually proposed involves the United States applying coercive pressure on both sides. The end of US support for Ukraine and the tightening of sanctions against Russia could shift the balance of power on the battlefield, increasing the tactical dilemma for each side between accepting the current line of conflict or risking more significant territorial losses and increased military/economic costs.

However, the disadvantage of a coercive strategy is that the parties may decide to resist US pressure instead of giving up their territorial claims. The settlement of the war To increase the likelihood of a settlement, the Trump administration should simultaneously pursue a strategy that allows for uncertainty about the future political status of the disputed territories.

By establishing a military demarcation line and an adjacent demilitarized buffer zone (which could be monitored by international, even European, peacekeeping forces), the settlement should avoid requiring Russia or Ukraine to renounce their territorial claims formally. Instead, political governance of the disputed territories (four regions and Crimea) should be postponed until post-war negotiations. Such ambiguity would allow Russia and Ukraine to temporarily accept the military demarcation line while continuing to defend their territorial claims domestically and internationally.

The uncertainty over territorial control could challenge maintaining a military settlement. Ukraine and Russia will likely remain committed to a future territorial "liberation." A prolonged diplomatic stalemate could encourage hardliners in both countries to use coercive, even military, means to achieve their goals. However, It is debatable whether demanding formal territorial concessions, even if successful, will significantly enhance the prospects for a lasting peace. As Germany did after the Treaty of Versailles or the USSR after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, a country that has formally ceded territory to an adversary may still seek to revise or reverse the settlement.

While the uncertainty of territorial status frustrates those who seek a definitive outcome, it offers two possible hopes for preserving a peaceful settlement. First, it gives the country hope that current losses can be compensated for in the event of future geopolitical changes. Ukraine can hope that political changes in Russia will enhance the prospects for territorial recovery, just as the Baltic states eventually gained independence after the collapse of the USSR.

Second, even if territorial status remains unresolved, there is an alternative hope that the countries' positions may shift over time. Domestic politics may eventually accept the current status as the new position. For example, immediately after the Korean War armistice, the South Korean government supported the militarized strategy of "pukjin" (advance north) for reunification. Today, while affirming the goal of reunification, contemporary South Korean policy has shown more remarkable restraint and caution in inter-Korean relations.

Suppose Ukraine's pro-Western orientation and Russia's occupation of its territory are strengthened. In that case, future governments in Ukraine and Russia may continue to view each other as adversaries but exercise more remarkable restraint in destabilizing the new de facto status quo.

Critics may ask whether it is possible to persuade either Ukraine or Russia to accept a settlement (provided that other contentious issues are resolved) that leaves the question of their core territorial claims open. Both countries, especially Russia, are unlikely to voluntarily accept such terms, which would require increased pressure from the United States and the West.

However, a military settlement is more likely if territorial ambiguity rather than exclusion prevails. Such an approach considers both countries' unwillingness to accept their current losses finally. Such a settlement structure could be seen as manipulative and accused of postponing the core issue of the conflict into future uncertainty.

However, after three years of war between Russia and Ukraine, the United States and the international community face a problematic strategic choice: to continue the risks and costs for a more definitive territorial outcome or to convince both countries to accept the risks of peace with an incomplete settlement of the territorial issue."

Prepared by Arman Galoyan