In an interview with the Argentinian newspaper Perfil, the special representative of the Azerbaijani president, Elchin Amirbekov, urged Armenia to hurry up and reach a peace agreement since this opportunity will not last forever. He noted that for this, Yerevan should make changes to its constitution, abandon territorial claims to its country, and withdraw foreign forces from the border areas.
By rushing the Armenian side to sign the agreement that had already been finally agreed upon between Armenia and Azerbaijan, official Baku is trying to create the impression that Yerevan is responsible for its delay. Meanwhile, over the past week, Yerevan has issued three messages at the highest level, Prime Minister Pashinyan, suggesting that Baku begin technical consultations on the place and time of signing the agreement. In other words, Yerevan, for its part, is trying to prove that Baku is not interested in signing a peace agreement as soon as possible. RA Deputy Foreign Minister Robert Abisoghomonyan also emphasized this circumstance in his speech at the special session of the OSCE Permanent Council convened at the initiative of Armenia the other day: "…..It is the right time to end the policy of artificial delays and procrastination, to refrain from presenting groundless excuses that only hinder the process of signing the Peace Agreement," he said.
Thus, the question arises: if both sides are interested in signing the agreement, why is it not happening?
Azerbaijan's Hidden Fears
Yerevan and Baku have entered into a diplomatic and propaganda conflict, largely due to the blackmail tactics employed by Baku. Shortly after the agreement was signed, Baku sought to portray Armenia as attempting to sabotage the peace process. This was evidenced by incidents along the Armenian-Azerbaijani contact line, where shots were fired, and by the dissemination of misinformation. Through these actions, Baku aimed to pressure Yerevan into hastening the implementation of anticipated constitutional changes and to initiate the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group.
Baku has two main reasons for acting in this way:
First, the international community (except, perhaps, Russia) will eventually view the agreement's non-signing or delay as a manifestation of Baku's torpedoing of the process. Baku is concerned not with the prospect of forming such an image in itself but with the fact that it would delegitimize any possible aggression against Armenia in the future.
Second, Baku fears that after the agreement is signed at this stage, Yerevan will no longer have anything to constrain it from fulfilling the additional conditions it has put forward outside the agreement, and it will no longer have any practical leverage to influence Yerevan. Therefore, Baku wants Armenia to sign it as soon as possible, but before that, it wants Armenia to fulfill the related conditions it has put forward.
For official Yerevan, the rapid signing of the agreement is a vital issue. It sees it as a means of establishing stability in the region and tying Azerbaijan's hands in its plans, breaking the chain of new peace demands from Azerbaijan.
The agreement's signing itself cannot guarantee peace. It is not difficult for Baku to create artificial obstacles to its implementation even after signing any document, as in the case of the November 9, 2020, trilateral statement. In this sense, maintaining peace and stability will be more beneficial to Armenia, at least in the foreseeable future, than to Azerbaijan. However, the prospect of losing its vast maneuvering opportunities and Armenia becoming more unfettered forces Baku to take measures now.
Baku's neck in a tightening noose
Baku has now found itself in a peculiar diplomatic pinch. The possibility of extracting more from Armenia without applying pressure is decreasing. Armenia has gained more freedom to insist that the remaining issues be discussed after the agreement is signed. On the other hand, it has become challenging to use force to fulfill the new conditions after the agreement text has been agreed. The international community, practically all the power centers, welcomed the positive outcome of the negotiations on the agreement and insisted on signing it as soon as possible. Their addressee is Azerbaijan. These are specific expectations that Baku cannot ignore. That is why the Aliyev administration also needs Armenia to be viewed as the party that failed to sign the agreement. However, this is already being perceived lightly since outsiders see Armenia making difficult peace decisions.
The signals that Baku received and continues to receive as a result of the information provocations carried out against Armenia make it evident that it has not been possible to "sell cheap" the trick of making Armenia an aggressor.
For example, against these provocations, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio had a phone conversation with Nikol Pashinyan and emphasized the importance of excluding any escalation in the region. The same Marco Rubio. Just days later, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan sent a message in Washington supporting peace in the South Caucasus, which was a step aimed at influencing Baku.
Against the same information provocations, the Iranian Foreign Minister visited Armenia and reaffirmed Tehran's principled position on the inviolability of regional borders in Yerevan's capital. He also called on the parties to quickly complete the signing of the peace agreement. In parallel, French Ambassador Olivier Decotigny and US Ambassador Christina Quinn left for Syunik. The official texts accompanying their visits specifically emphasized the importance of respecting sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity in addition to threats and increased tension.
Aliyev, at least at this stage, has not found support from his strategic partner, Turkey. Erdogan is involved in profound domestic political upheavals but manages to hint at the importance of peace in his congratulatory message to Ilham Aliyev during the Nowruz holiday. Despite Baku's resistance, the Margara checkpoint is being permanently opened to Syria under the guise of transporting Armenian humanitarian cargo, more like a gesture by Ankara to establish communication with Armenia.
Under these circumstances, Baku can only either, at least temporarily, come to terms with the new realities created or further complicate the situation by trying to make these same power centers consider its demands. This is possible if Baku receives Russian encouragement.
To reduce the prospect of the second option in particular, Yerevan has no choice but to increase international pressure on Baku and delegitimize its evasive behavior in any way. From this point of view, the OSCE platform, in this case, the convening of a special session of the organization's permanent council, was, on the one hand, a crucial tactical step but, on the other hand, a symbolic one, given the zeal with which Baku wants to neutralize the OSCE platform itself.
Gor Abrahamyan
