Despite the continuous denials of the RA Ministry of Defense, the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry has not stopped spreading disinformation daily since March 16 about the alleged shelling of their positions by the Armenian Armed Forces.
Baku unleashed this disinformation campaign after both sides made statements about the full agreement on the text of the peace treaty and the establishment of bilateral relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
During that time, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, made three short statements that Armenia was ready to sign the peace treaty, suggesting that the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, begin consultations on its signing and that the Armenian Armed Forces are instructed not to commit any violations of the ceasefire regime, since "Armenia is going for peace, not war."
In this way, Yerevan indirectly stated that the purpose of Azerbaijan's information provocations is to create artificial new obstacles to the signing of that treaty. It is evident that the addressee of such a message is not the internal communities of Azerbaijan and Armenia, which know the border situation perfectly well, but international players.
Yerevan probably understands why Baku is escalating the situation, especially immediately after the agreement on the text of the agreement.
Baku's external and internal curtseys
The first reason is that Baku considers the simultaneous agreement on two of the 17 points to be Yerevan's attempt to reach the signing stage quickly. Taking advantage of this, Azerbaijan is trying to achieve, by creating the effect of additional pressure and the threat of war, that Yerevan, on the one hand, will give explicit guarantees for the implementation of the constitutional changes they expect and, on the other hand, will jointly initiate the international legal procedure for dissolving the OSCE Minsk Group as soon as possible.
For Baku, solving this problem comprehensively at the current stage is essential, essentialially because they understand that the more time passes, the more the international community will perceive Azerbaijan as a subject torpedoing the peace process and destabilizing the South Caucasus region.
The second main reason is that rushing to sign an agreed agreement with Armenia deprives the Aliyev administration of the opportunity to demonize Armenia and use the threat of war as a means of containing public sentiment in its own country. The image of a "victorious leader" that Aliyev has created as a result of the 44-day war, the de-Armenianization of Nagorno-Karabakh, his monthly visits to Nagorno-Karabakh, and his harsh rhetoric against Armenia will lose its political value after the signing of the peace agreement. The mass disobedience and protest actions that began in Turkey before Aliyev's eyes are destroying the image of the most victorious Erdogan, showing that even the laurels of "returning" Syria may not help him, and such an image does not give him the indulgence to keep power under control. Understanding this circumstance, Aliyev does not want to lose the tool to influence his society under the pretext of an external threat from Armenia.
Third, Azerbaijan's border manipulation is perhaps directly related to the increasingly tight military-political circle around Iran. Baku understood that Yerevan had agreed on two controversial points because it was trying to normalize relations with Iran and give it legal form before possible destabilization around Iran. This has two important reasons for Armenia. First, to minimize the possibility of Azerbaijan taking advantage of the possible American-Israeli military operations against Iran and implementing the Azerbaijani vision of the so-called "Zangezur Corridor." This can happen especially if Azerbaijan manages to "sell" the need for a solution to the "Zangezur Corridor" in an anti-Iranian package, that is, to present it as a means of blocking Iran from the north or as a "reward" for its support in the anti-Iranian campaign. In other words, to tempt Donald Trump into a deal. In this sense, Azerbaijan is trying to show that the agreement on the text of the agreement does not mean anything yet and is ready for discussions, thereby also raising its price in the same anti-Iranian context.
American slap and Russian pancakes
Despite this, Baku's persistent efforts still have not reached their goal. After the first few false statements about the ceasefire violations by the Armenian Armed Forces, the EU Monitoring Group in Armenia announced that nothing special was happening on the border. By doing so, the group, on the one hand, refuted Azerbaijani disinformation and, on the other hand, proved to the West that Armenia, in addition to being theoretically not interested in border destabilization, is also not taking any steps towards escalation in practice, and Baku's claims about its intentions to start a war against Azerbaijan have no basis.
In addition, on March 18, the US President's National Security Advisor Michael Waltz posted on the microblog X that he had a conversation with Hikmet Hajiyev, an advisor to the Azerbaijani president, that “the conflict in the South Caucasus must end, for this purpose, the peace process must be completed, the prisoners must be released.” The sounding of these critical messages against the backdrop of this disinformation campaign by Azerbaijan was nothing more than a manifestation of restraining Azerbaijan, not justifying its aggressive behavior. With this statement, the US made it clear that, at this stage, it is not interested in creating a new hotbed of tension in the South Caucasus region. Therefore, the Azerbaijani “deal” proposal is still not acceptable.
This approach increases Yerevan’s ability to give flesh and blood to the Armenian-American strategic partnership, especially as a straitjacket for Azerbaijan, given that the signed charter on strategic partnership does not mention the restoration of regional communications from the standpoint of protecting the “Zangezur Corridor” but rather the Armenian concept of the “Crossroads of Peace.”
Moscow supports Azerbaijan’s destabilizing behavior. At a traditional briefing on March 19, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated that Russia is concerned about the news of increased tension on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border amid progress on the peace treaty between Baku and Yerevan and “calls on partners to exercise restraint and avoid actions that could escalate the situation.” Zakharova, considering the statements coming from Azerbaijan credible, indirectly blames Yerevan for the increase in tension, which is nothing more than direct support for Baku’s actions.
Receiving such signals from Russia may encourage Baku to increase pressure on Armenia. This may be manifested by raising the tension to another level and starting to shell Armenian positions on its initiative. In this way, the Baku authorities may provoke the Armenian side to resort to retaliatory actions and present them as an argument for the currently unfounded statements. On the other hand, this will become a means to weaken the apparent pressure of the West to bring the peace process to its logical conclusion. All this requires nerves and maximum composure from Armenia.
Gor Abrahamyan
