The second round of talks between the US and Russian delegations about ending the Ukrainian war occurred in Istanbul on February 27. Unlike the first talks held in the capital of Saudi Arabia on February 18, which were led by the heads of the foreign ministries of both countries, the Istanbul meeting was at an expert level. The main issue on the agenda was the removal of obstacles to the full resumption of the activities of the US and Russian embassies in each other's countries.

In this case, however, the recording of this intermediate result was not the only remarkable thing; the second round of talks was also held in Turkey.

Turkish jealousy and intrigues

On February 18, when the US and Russian delegations held their first symbolic meeting in Saudi Arabia, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan received Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Although the latter stayed in Ankara for a few hours, Erdogan and Zelensky made notable statements against the backdrop of the Riyadh talks. In particular, Zelensky announced that they would not accept any outcome of the negotiations on Ukraine without Ukraine's participation. In addition, he noted that not only Kyiv but also Europe and… Turkey should participate in the Ukrainian peace process. This is despite Zelensky never mentioning the need for Turkey's participation when addressing the issue before.

Moreover, only after leaving for Ankara did it become clear that Zelensky was indefinitely postponing his visit to Riyadh, which was scheduled for the next day, February 19. This could not be assessed otherwise other than as a demarche not only against the talks in Riyadh but also against Saudi Arabia itself as a platform or mediator for negotiations.

Erdogan, in turn, stated at a joint press conference after the meeting with Zelensky that Turkey unequivocally supports Ukraine's territorial integrity. Erdogan also noted that Turkey is ready to be a suitable venue for any Ukrainian peace talks.

In essence, in this way, the Turkish authorities demonstrated how jealously they approached the role assigned to Saudi Arabia within the framework of the Ukrainian problem's settlement process and made the pretensions of the negotiating mediator to "pull the blanket over themselves" seem obvious. In this sense, it should not be considered a coincidence that on February 23, after the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Turkey, the second round of Russian-American negotiations was held in Turkey. It must be assumed that this happened due to agreements with Lavrov, considering that the previous choice of the venue for the Riyadh meeting was also at the initiative of the United States.

The question arises: What is the meaning of Ankara's anxiety in this process and the current initiative arising from it? Why is Ankara, as they say, "like a spoon without a tail," throwing itself into this Russian-American process?

Turkish fears and possible deals

First, it should be said that Turkey has been present in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, almost always in the guise of a "peacemaker." In practice, since the beginning of 2022, Turkey has offered to be a platform for contacts between the two sides. First, in March 2022, as a result of the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of Ukraine and Russia in Antalya, then the subsequent meetings of the two countries' delegations, and the negotiations that continued thereafter, a reconciliation agreement was almost agreed upon. Then, on the "Turkish platform," the conflicting parties began to discuss the "grain deal," later the exchange of prisoners, and later the issues of navigation safety in the Black Sea. This role seriously increased Turkey's regional weight, which Ankara does not want to give up.

Secondly, Ankara quickly realized that the Russian-American agenda on the Ukrainian crisis was much more comprehensive than one might have expected. It also touches on the Middle East region, including the Syrian issue. This was evidenced by the US special envoy for the Middle East, Stephen Witkoff, who also participated in the negotiations in Riyadh as part of the American delegation. In addition, Russian President Vladimir Putin hinted at including the Middle East topic in the talks. Considering the vital interests pursued by Ankara in the Middle East, which has "appropriated" Syria and is carried away by expansionist winds, it is evident that the latter does not want to appear in the status of a secondary actor and give up its positions, especially to Saudi Arabia, which is continuously increasing its authority in the region.

Thirdly, it should also be taken into account that no matter how much Turkey tries to position itself as an interested party in stopping the Ukrainian war, it is Turkey that is most interested in continuing that conflict. As a result, Turkey has turned into a key energy pill in Ukraine 

opened the production of uncrewed aerial vehicles, "Bayraktar," and gained influence in the Ukrainian military industry.

Turkey also cannot leave Crimea indifferent. Having the status of a mediator in possible Russian-Ukrainian negotiations, Ankara is seen as weak, but it is still an opportunity to prevent the final Russification of Crimea. The theses voiced by the new Washington administration on stopping military operations on the existing line of contact and establishing the status quo are perceived in Ankara, perhaps, as a "corridor" for legitimizing the Russian annexation of the occupied Ukrainian territories by the US, which does not fit into the circle of Turkish interests. Ankara does not want to lose even the slightest influence on this issue.

Fourth, Ankara views its mediation efforts in the context of issues related to its interests, including the South Caucasus, as an opportunity to "sell Moscow at a high price." It should not be considered a coincidence that the South Caucasus was one of the main issues discussed during Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov's visit to Turkey on February 23. After meeting with his Turkish counterpart, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Lavrov emphasized that during the negotiations, "special attention was paid to strengthening trust between the parties, restoring infrastructure and transport communications, and cooperation within the "3+3" format in the South Caucasus region."

By the way, it is noteworthy that after Lavrov's visit, Hikmet Hajiyev, an advisor to the President of Azerbaijan, also rushed to Ankara...

Gor Abrahamyan