Opinion

The specter of a forced Ukrainian "deal": will there be "barter" in the South Caucasus?

Although the 47th President of the United States, Donald Trump, confidently claimed that he could stop the Ukrainian war in 24 hours, “the cannons do not fall silent” on the line of contact. Moreover, in parallel with the ground battles, the conflicting parties have increased the scale and intensity of their drone strikes on each other. Russian troops are slowly advancing in the directions of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv, occupying new territories and settlements.

Trump’s “100-day” push

After the predictable failure of Trump’s populist plan to end the conflict in “24 hours”, he instructed his special representative for Ukraine and Russia, Keith Kellogg, to achieve an end to the Ukrainian war within 100 days. Although analysts are again skeptical about the success of Kellogg’s mission, in this case, Trump specifies the methods of achieving the goal. Through his microblog “X,” he addressed Russian President V. Putin, threatening to collapse the Russian economy with new, stricter sanctions if Moscow does not stop the “senseless war” and make a “deal.” Meanwhile, newly appointed US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and EU High Representative Kaja Kallas agreed to maintain “maximum pressure” on Russia to ensure a lasting peace in Ukraine.

At the same time, speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos the other day, Trump called on the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC, to lower oil prices, noting that this would immediately end the war. Trump did not hide that he would give the “green light” to increase oil production in the United States. The goal is to improve the share of American oil in the European market and stimulate a decline in world oil prices. According to Washington’s calculations, these measures should have a devastating effect on the Russian economy, which is “on the needle” of hydrocarbons.

The new US president is trying to implement his plan to achieve peace in Ukraine using the formula of “peace through coercion,” creating unprecedentedly difficult conditions for Russia that will not allow it to maintain the war and will force it to sit down at the negotiating table with Kyiv.

Trump is trying to apply the same formula to Ukraine. On the one hand, he declares that he is not going to continue allocating huge funds to arm Ukraine at the expense of the Americans, on the other hand, he accuses Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky of not concluding a deal with the Russians earlier, which cannot be interpreted in any other way than to make Kyiv responsible for the consequences of the war.

Official Kyiv agreed to start negotiations at the House of Representatives' urging. Zelensky stated they were ready for talks but confident Moscow would not take that step. At the same time, however, Zelensky had called on his Western partners to increase pressure on Moscow.

These statements further reveal Kyiv's desperation, which is associated with the authoritarian state of the armed forces due to prolonged military operations and with the behavior of the United States and the European Union, which is taking a particular course of retreat.

Meanwhile, official Moscow shows that it does not want to rush. In response to Trump's ultimatum, Vladimir Putin stated that Russia does not refuse peace talks. Still, he hinted that they want to talk with Washington on a broader agenda, starting with Ukraine and ending with world oil prices. Putin also noted that he does not consider any possible negotiations with President Zelensky legitimate until the latter lifts his order banning any talks on a settlement with Russia.

Russian maneuvers before major negotiations

Despite this circumstance, a certain softening is noticeable in Russia's positions. Previously, Moscow considered peace negotiations possible only on the condition of excluding Ukraine from NATO membership, sharply limiting the Ukrainian armed forces, completely withdrawing Ukrainian troops from the Ukrainian regions annexed by it and the Kursk region of the Russian Federation, and lifting all sanctions against Russia. Russia only speaks of the need to consider the “realities on the ground.” This is nothing more than stopping at the existing line of contact, establishing a new status quo, and abandoning other territorial claims.

Such a position against the background of advances on the battlefield indicates that Russia is not interested in continuing the war. There are several reasons for this: the ongoing economic decline, in this context, Ukraine's decision to stop the transit of gas from Russia to Europe through its territory, the reality of the imposition of new, perhaps already devastating, sanctions by the West, the deepening of the significant deficit of its combat-ready human resources to service the war.

In essence, a situation is created when all parties involved in the conflict are interested in ending the war and no longer hide it. This circumstance increases the possibility of a cessation of hostilities in Ukraine, Kursk, during the next few months. The whole issue is under which side's dominance the new negotiations will begin. Increasing the scale of strikes on each other and striving to inflict as much damage as possible on the opponent, Kyiv and Moscow are trying to weaken each other's negotiating positions and act as a dictator, or at least an extortionist, of greater concessions.

The current desperate show of force for Ukraine is also a demonstration to its Western partners that they have the potential to continue the fight. Russia is maneuvering more, trying to understand how decisive Trump will be in his threats, and is pinning its hopes on deepening the distrust between the Trumpian US and Europe. Kyiv's negotiating legitimacy can only be viewed in this logic.

A ceasefire or a peace treaty?

Another key tactical question is what kind of ceasefire we will discuss. It is in Kyiv’s interests that the war be stopped by a ceasefire agreement, not a peace treaty. This will allow it to keep the issue of returning the occupied territories on the agenda and restore its forces to achieve revenge in the future.

A tactical ceasefire is also beneficial for Europe since it will allow it to keep the possibility of dialogue with Russia on energy issues open. In the case of the United States, the situation is twofold. Trump, who has assumed the role of the “great peacemaker,” has the egoistic ambitions that the deal being made be fundamental, even if Ukraine will pay for it. In this regard, Trump’s desire to negotiate directly with Putin is understandable.

It is also beneficial for Russia that a comprehensive peace treaty stop the war. In this way, Moscow will hope to internationally consolidate the occupation of Ukrainian territories already under its control. However, Kyiv has the counter-argument of playing up the Kursk region issue against it. In case of more significant successes on the battlefield, Moscow can also hope for “bonuses” in achieving Ukraine’s buffering.

Meanwhile, from the West’s perspective, providing Russia with a “corridor” to act as a winner is fraught with the risk of creating a “Pandora’s box” for Putin’s Russia to implement ambitious plans to satisfy its imperial ambitions in other regions and the collapse of the entire system of international law.

The South Caucasus Consequences of a Possible Ukrainian “Stoppage”

It is from this perspective that the recent developments around Ukraine directly affect the interests of Armenia. On the one hand, the cessation of the war in Ukraine will allow Moscow to focus more on its problems in the South Caucasus, which, for the time being, the latter, willy-nilly, have left to Turkey’s discretion. However, whether Russia will turn its gaze to the region with a victorious or “face-saving” mentality will determine what kind of future balance of power will be formed here. The “victorious” Russia will unbridledly strive to stifle Armenia’s aspirations for European integration and turn the charter of Armenia-US strategic cooperation into a lifeless piece of paper. Both the intention to include Armenia in the Russian-Belarusian “common state” and the intention to incline Yerevan to the Turkish-Azerbaijani concept of the Zangezur “corridor” may be activated, which is the only practical lever after the fall of Nagorno-Karabakh to maintain the status of a “controller” in the region and the political influence that comes from it. It is no coincidence that, ignoring the Armenian proposal for the “Crossroads of Peace”, Moscow insists on the option of reopening regional communications stemming from the 2020 trilateral statement. In this sense, the Russian-Turkish-Azerbaijani “alliance” can be further strengthened.

Meanwhile, if Russia emerges from the Ukrainian quagmire as a “face-saver,” it will undoubtedly become more moderate in its ambitions. This may allow Yerevan to form more constructive and balanced relations with Moscow and further enhance its subjectivity and regional authority.

However, there is one problem here. Donald Trump approaches political realities with the mindset of a businessman. For him, there are no political negotiations or settlements as political categories, only a deal. Although the US-Armenia strategic partnership document could not have been signed without the agreement in principle of the new administration, to date, neither the White House nor the State Department have expressed precise, conceptual approaches to that document or the South Caucasus. In this sense, Washington's regional policy remains uncertain and unpredictable. However, if Washington and Moscow decide to resolve the Ukrainian conflict through the logic of a "deal" and the possible Trump-Putin meeting aimed at it, as Moscow expects, takes place with a broader political agenda, it cannot be ruled out that they may discuss the option of "barter" solutions, and the parties possible concessions should also apply to other regions, including the South Caucasus.

In other words, without any serious opportunity to influence the situation, Yerevan will continue to depend on the process of resolving the Ukrainian conflict for its security interests.

Gor Abrahamyan