Armenia's social and political circles had extreme and sometimes polarized expectations regarding the Sochi meeting. One part expected that a "draft" of the peace treaty would be signed, signaling the start of a new negotiation process; others believed that Armenia and Azerbaijan would reject Moscow's mediation role, giving preference to Brussels and Washington. However, neither one nor the other happened. The statement following the meeting is an attempt to fix the current state of things, mainly improving the current situation in the region and freezing the existing "status quo." The most important clause of the statement was as follows: "Noting the key contribution of the Russian peacekeeping force in ensuring security in the area of ​​its deployment, we emphasized the need for its efforts to stabilize the situation in the region."

The parties, therefore, accept the "demand" for the existence and activity of peacekeepers, that is, the existence of the conflict and the impossibility of solutions at the current stage. And that is the maximum that the moderator of the parties and the leading player, Russia, needs now. Russia is now stuck in the Ukrainian war, cannot find ways out of the conflict, is under unprecedented sanctions, is dependent on cooperation with Turkey in many areas, and, at least at this stage, has no intention of changing the status quo in the region. Maybe in the future, it will be interested in changing the status quo after the resolution of the Ukrainian conflict, but at this stage, as things stand, changing the status quo only entails unmanageability and additional risks for Russia. RA Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's statement that Armenia agrees to extend the presence of Russian peacekeepers in Artsakh for 5-10-15 years is aimed at this.

But what does Azerbaijan think about all this? Azerbaijan, of course, is the first loser of the presence of peacekeepers and maintenance of the status quo. But, unfortunately, or fortunately, it is not the question of his or Armenia's weight class. It is the result of the Turkish-Russian agreement, and Azerbaijan will have to reckon with it. On the other hand, Azerbaijan can receive additional income, "calories," and concessions from Russia, especially in exchange for selling Russian energy sources to Europe through its territory.

And what does the West and, mainly, the US regime think? The US, of course, will not be against pacifying the region, pushing Russia out, and increasing its influence. But in that case, it will get a more ungovernable Turkey, strengthening its position. But the question will remain whether Turkey can fill the vacuum caused by Russia's absence or whether Iran will not be directly involved in the process. The US, of course, is not against changing the situation. Still, at this stage, Russia has, if not the majority, a 51% share in the region, mainly in the form of military power and economic leverage. No one, at least apparently, is trying to change that balance. It turns out, then, that Russia is weak in the western wing but firm in the eastern, finding a new ally in the form of Iran and thereby trying to balance the Turkish-Israeli-Azerbaijani tandem.

All these issues are equations with many unknowns, risks, and dead ends, the most optimal solution of which is preserving the current regional status quo, leaving new steps and movements to more "enlightened" and good times.